NOVEMBER 2022 | 43 THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL exercise of Article I power, which authorized the enforcement of local ordinances as to Indians. The shift in local laws affected the general organization and authority of the affected municipalities.33 It did not alter Congress’s exercise of Article I authority authorizing those municipalities to lawfully assume jurisdiction over ordinance violations by Indians.34 Congress could repeal the authorization from §14, but to date, it has never done so. It is important to note, in closing, that the appellate courts have yet to resolve the question of whether §14 continues to grant municipalities within the reservations of the Five Civilized Tribes the authority to lawfully assume jurisdiction over ordinance violations by Indians. The relevant provision from §14 was a unique enactment by Congress applicable to a unique area of the United States at the time of its enactment. As such, the appellate courts have never had occasion to consider this kind of unique legal argument. Until the appellate courts resolve this issue, hundreds of cities and towns across the reservations of the Five Civilized Tribes will be forced to decide whether to avail themselves of this argument or to decline to enforce the local ordinances their inhabitants have adopted as to those inhabitants who are Indian. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Matthew Love serves as general counsel for the Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group (OMAG), a governmental risk pool formed by interlocal agreements executed by hundreds of Oklahoma cities and towns. He also serves as city attorney for the city of Warr Acres, city prosecutor for The Village and as legal advisor to the Oklahoma Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP). ENDNOTES 1. 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020). 2. Indian country includes all land within the borders of an Indian reservation. 18 U.S.C. §1151. As Chrissi Ross Nimmo noted in endnotes 8 and 9 of her OBJ article, infra at n. 5, the courts have recognized the continued existence of the reservations of the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee Nation, Chickasaw Nation, Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Muscogee Creek Nation and Seminole Nation) in light of McGirt. 3. A person is legally Indian if 1) they have some Indian blood and 2) they are recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government. Parker v. State, 2021 OK CR 17, ¶35, 495 P.3d 653, 665 citing United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). 4. I would encourage readers to review Chrissi Ross Nimmo’s article in the March 2022 bar journal, wherein she offers an opposing view on this topic. Chrissi Ross Nimmo, “Oklahoma Cities and Towns in Indian Country are not Immune From the U.S. Supreme Court’s Holding in McGirt,” OBJ 93 Vol 3 (2022), https://bit.ly/3LS7EJu. 5. United States District Judge William Johnson and Okmulgee County District Judge Pandee Ramirez both dismissed class action lawsuits against municipalities based (in whole or in part) on §14 of the Curtis Act. Hooper v. City of Tulsa, No. 21-CV-165-WPJ-JFJ, 2022 WL 1105674 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2022) and Nicholson et al v. City of Beggs et al, Okmulgee County Dist. Court Case No. CJ-20-94, Order Dismissing Case (Nov. 24, 2020). The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed Judge Ramirez’s order on other grounds, expressly declining to address the Curtis Act argument. Nicholson v. Stitt, 2022 OK 35, fn.6, 508 P.3d 442. 6. 142 S.Ct. 2486 (2022). 7. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). 8. 11 O.S. §14-111(B)(1) & (C). There are additional restrictions on the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal courts over certain types of misdemeanors. For example, a municipal court not of record has no subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). See 47 O.S. §11-902(C)(7). 9. Castro-Huerta, 142 S.Ct. at 2493. 10. Id. 11. Castro-Huerta, 142 S.Ct. at 2494. 12. 25 U.S.C. §1321. Oklahoma has never sought or obtained jurisdiction pursuant to PL 280. 13. See Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (25 U.S.C. §232) (New York); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa), repealed, Act of Dec. 11, 2018, Pub. L. 115–301, 132 Stat. 4395; Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota). 14. 18 U.S.C. §1153 (authorizing federal jurisdiction over 13 enumerated offenses when committed by one Indian against another Indian). In dicta, the majority appeared to question whether the MCA actually preempts the exercise of state jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian major crimes. Castro-Huerta, 142 S.Ct. at 2496, “even assuming that the text of the Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.” The court cited United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) and Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993), as support for its statement that the preemptive effect of the MCA was an assumption – a curious move given that those cases establish that point as precedent. To the extent that the majority was suggesting its willingness to revisit those prior precedents, there would be little effect on municipal court jurisdiction should those prior precedents be modified or overruled in the future. The MCA only applies to 13 offenses, almost all of which are felonies in Oklahoma. As such, municipal courts would not have jurisdiction over those felony major crimes even if the Supreme Court revisited its prior MCA holdings. 15. Id. at 2494-99 (crimes by non-Indians with Indian victims). The court noted in footnote 2 that federal law does not preempt the state from exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed by an Indian against a non-Indian, and any preemption would have to be the result of the second step in the Castro-Huerta analysis. 16. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 17. Id. at 2499-2502. States have long possessed the unquestioned authority to prosecute crimes involving only non-Indians. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882). 18. See e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) “When Indians (‘who’) act outside of their own Indian country (‘where’), including within the Indian country of another tribe, they are subject to nondiscriminatory state laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state.” 19. See e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 20. Consider footnote 9 from Castro-Huerta, where the majority characterized Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that, “States may not exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians in Indian country” as being “not accurate.” In doing so, however, the court made clear that it was not addressing that issue. 21. Castro-Huerta, 142 S.Ct. at 2521 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) “The Court may choose to disregard our precedents, but it does not purport to overrule a single one.” 22. Castro-Huerta, 142 S.Ct. at 2500 (Public Law 280 exists to grant state jurisdiction, where its exercise would otherwise be preempted as an unlawful infringement on tribal self-government, citing Bracker). 23. Act of June 28, 1898, §14, 30 Stat. 499-500. 24. U.S. v. City of McAlester, 604 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1979). 25. Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 83. 26. See Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 62 (1928) and Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 409 (1935), both interpreting, when Congress stated in an 1897 enactment, Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 83, that the territorial laws in place within the Indian territory would apply to all “irrespective of race,” Congress was intending to state that the laws would apply to Indians as well as non-Indians. 27. Act of June 28, 1898, §29, 30 Stat. 512. 28. Act of June 28, 1898, §29, 30 Stat. 505 (Chickasaw and Choctaw nations); Act of March 1, 1901, §41, 31 Stat 872 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation); Act of July 1, 1902, §73, 32 Stat. 727 (Cherokee Nation). 29. Act of June 16, 1906, §13 and §21, 34 Stat. 275 and 277-78. 30. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 571 (1912). 31. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894). 32. Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288, 292-93 (1918). 33. Lackey v. State, 1911 OK 270, ¶3, 116 P. 913. 34. For this reason, cities and towns incorporating within the borders of the Five Civilized Tribes post-statehood are authorized to lawfully assume jurisdiction over ordinance violations by Indians. This is true both because of §14 itself and because each of the tribes agreed to maintain §14 in full force and effect within their respective reservations.
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