THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 34 | JANUARY 2025 1973 OK 148, ¶6, 519 P.2d 1346, 1348; United States v. Tomlinson, 764 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2014). 4. Russell v. Davison, 1939 OK 1, ¶21, 89 P.2d 352, 357; Woods v. State, 1988 OK CR 222, ¶10, 762 P.2d 987, 989; 21 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §5037.1 (2d ed. 2024). 5. Phillips v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, LP, 2024 OK CIV APP 4, ¶41, 544 P.3d 980, 992; Drouillard v. Jensen Const. Co. of Oklahoma, 1979 OK 126, ¶5, 601 P.2d 92, 93 (holding that “[i]f a defendant presents evidence after his demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence is overruled, that particular demurrer is waived” and the defendant must move for a directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence to preserve the challenge for review). As commentators have noted, “Case law is sparse and indirect on whether a demurrer to the evidence [at the close of the plaintiff’s case] is required to preserve sufficiency of the evidence.” 5 Harvey D. Ellis Jr. and Clyde A. Muchmore, Oklahoma Appellate Practice §15:6 (2024 ed.). Rather than risk the issue, counsel should raise any sufficiency challenge both at the close of the plaintiff’s case (a demurrer) and, if a defense case is presented, at the close of all the evidence (a directed verdict). 6. Omalza v. State, 1995 OK CR 80, ¶97, 911 P.2d 286, 310; Young v. State, 2000 OK CR 17, ¶34, 12 P.3d 20, 35. 7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2), (b); Brothers v. Johnson, 105 F.4th 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2024). 8. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); United States v. Freeman, 70 F.4th 1265, 1272 (10th Cir. 2023) (defendant must “renew the motion ... after introducing evidence in his own defense”). 9. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1); United States v. Gonzalez, 528 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). 10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(2); Baker v. Shaw, 1938 OK 628, ¶5, 184 Okla. 194, 86 P.2d 319, 321; Ellis and Muchmore, supra, note 5, §15:26. 11. Quarles v. Panchal, 2011 OK 13, ¶7, 250 P.3d 320, 322; Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th Cir. 1990). 12. Rodebush By & Through Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 1993 OK 160, 867 P.2d 1241, 1245 n.2; Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1319 (10th Cir. 1998). 13. Levy v. Tharrington, 1936 OK 711, ¶3, 62 P.2d 641, 642; Booth Tank Co. v. Symes, 1964 OK 160, ¶14, 394 P.2d 493, 497. 14. 12 O.S. §630; 22 O.S. §86; Fed. R. Civ. P. 46; Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see also United States v. Paul, 542 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2008). 15. See Wright and Miller, supra, note 4 §5037.4; 1 McCormick on Evidence §52 (8th ed. 2022). 16. See id. 17. McCormick, supra, note 15, §52. 18. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Davis, 1913 OK 295, ¶2, 132 P. 337, 339; Relf v. State, 1929 OK CR 345, 280 P. 851, 853; see also Wright and Miller, supra, note 4 §5037.7 (describing the waiver rule as “nonsense”). 19. United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d at 975; United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). 20. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 2009). 21. See McCormick, supra, note 15, §52 (providing examples of general objections). 22. One clear exception to this advice is with sufficiency of the evidence challenges, where specificity is either unnecessary to preserve the issue for appeal (as in criminal cases), Speegle v. State, 1976 OK CR 299, ¶31, 556 P.2d 1045, 1049; United States v. Murphy, 100 F.4th 1184, 1194 (10th Cir. 2024), or the requirement is less rigorously enforced (as in civil cases). See Oklahoma City v. Richardson, 1937 OK 195, ¶4, 69 P.2d 334, 335 (“[I]f the trial court is content to rule upon a general demurrer to the evidence or motion for directed verdict, without requiring the reasons to be stated, and the other party is likewise content, this court is bound to pass upon any issue in the case which reasonably may be said to be within the scope of the demurrer or motion.” (citation omitted)); Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., 569 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2009) (“In evaluating the sufficiency of a Rule 50 motion, we liberally construe Rule 50's requirements. Technical precision is unnecessary.” (citation omitted)); Myklatun v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 734 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013) (“When the party moving for judgment as a matter of law fails to articulate its motion with sufficient specificity, the non-moving party must object in order to preserve the issue for appeal.” (alteration omitted)). 23. See McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1350 (10th Cir. 2004); Graves v. Graves, 1970 OK 177, ¶10, 475 P.2d 171, 176; Armstrong v. State, 1991 OK CR 34, ¶23, 811 P.2d 593, 599. 24. Hall v. United States, 378 F.2d 349, 350 (10th Cir. 1967). 25. See Wright and Miller, supra, note 4, §5036.2 (“If the party has filed a motion in limine or has made a more specific objection to a prior attempt to elicit similar evidence, less specific later objections will more likely suffice.”). 26. Slater v. Mefford, 188 Okla. 525, 111 P.2d 159, 160 (1940); see also Nelson v. Pollay, 1996 OK 142, ¶13, 916 P.2d 1369, 1376 (“An appellate court will not make first-instance determinations of law or fact.”). 27. Fixico v. State, 1987 OK CR 64, 735 P.2d 580, 583 (citing Midwestern Engine & Equip. Co. v. Childers, 1957 OK 274, ¶4, 323 P.2d 738, 740-41). 28. United States v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1984). 29. Id. at 1448. 30. See United States v. Banks, 687 F.2d 967, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353, 355-56 (7th Cir. 1968). 31. See McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1448-49; Wright and Miller, supra, note 4, §5034.3 (“Presumably the lawyer need not push the judge to the edge of contempt; if the judge refuses to rule despite a request to do so, the refusal to rule should be treated as an error itself for purposes of review.”). 32. Duke v. Duke, 2020 OK 6, ¶34, 457 P.3d 1073, 1085 (“A trial court’s record constitutes the only means for communication of its proceedings to an appellate court.”). 33. In re Baby Girl L., 2002 OK 9, ¶50, 51 P.3d 544, 561; Hamid v. Sew Original, 1982 OK 46, ¶6, 645 P.2d 496, 497; Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy W., 1992 OK 58, ¶14, 831 P.2d 643, 646 (appellate court affirmed judgment since, without an entire trial transcript and “nothing in the record to show that the trial court ruled incorrectly,” “it must be assumed that the facts underlying the trial court’s judgment were proven.”). 34. United States v. Bornfield, 184 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999). 35. See id.; Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.30; Fed. R. App. P. 10(c). 36. Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, ¶36, 164 P.3d 208, 220; see Cox v. Sarkeys, 1956 OK 294, ¶19, 304 P.2d 979, 984-85. 37. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988) (discussing requirement under Oklahoma law). While this step is not required in federal court, see United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2000), it remains a best practice regardless of forum. Failure to excuse a challenged-for-cause juror may result in a determination on appeal that a party’s concerns of prejudice were not genuine. See Turnbull v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 1991 WL 544257, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 1991). 38. Matthews v. State, 2002 OK CR 16, ¶16, 45 P.3d 907, 915; Cox, 304 P.2d at 985. 39. Sanchez v. State, 2009 OK CR 31, ¶37, 223 P.3d 980, 995; Cox, 304 P.2d at 985; City of Guthrie v. Snyder, 1914 OK 412, 143 P. 8, 9. 40. Eizember, 164 P.3d at 220; Snyder, 143 P. at 9. 41. Clark v. Turner, 2004 OK CIV APP 69, ¶23, 99 P.3d 736, 741. 42. Id. 43. United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1993). 44. Clark, 99 P.3d at 742-43. 45. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d at 988. 46. Fed. R. Evid. 103; 12 O.S. §2104. 47. Yeager v. Farmer, 1976 OK 44, ¶¶21-23, 549 P.2d 345, 348. 48. United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404, 1406-1407 (10th Cir. 1991)). 49. Id. (citations omitted). 50. Id. (citations omitted). 51. Id. at 1242 (citations omitted). 52. Id. at 1241-42. 53. Id. 54. Id. at 1241. 55. 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §348; Wright and Miller, supra note 4, §5040.6; see also Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982). 56. Carver v. Knutson Elevators, Inc., 1955 OK 183, ¶15, 285 P.2d 391, 395; Midland Sav. & Loan Co. v. Cheves, 1916 OK 629, ¶4, 158 P. 362, 363 (“If a party opens the door for the admission of incompetent evidence, he is in no plight to complain that his adversary followed through the door thus opened.”). 57. See id. ¶¶4-5. 58. Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 839 F.3d 1251, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Reinard v. Crown Equip. Corp., 983 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[P]reemptively introducing evidence constitutes a waiver of any objection to the evidence’s admission even if the opposing party referenced the evidence in its opening statement.”). 59. Mitchell v. Koch, 1943 OK 402, ¶¶14-15, 143 P.2d 811, 812-13. 60. EEOC v. JetStream Ground Servs., Inc., 878 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 2000). 61. See Mitchell v. Koch, 143 P.2d at 813. 62. Lerma v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 OK 84, ¶23, 148 P.3d 880, 886. 63. United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1983) (reviewing improper judicial comments not objected to for plain error); Preventive Energy Sols., LLC v. nCap Ventures 5, LLC, 2023 WL 7148434, at *11-12 (10th Cir. Oct. 31, 2023) (same); McCracken v. State, 1994 OK CR 68, ¶13, 887 P.2d 323, 328 (same). 64. United States v. Currie, 911 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092, 1096 (10th Cir. 2008); Smith v. State, 1979 OK CR 83, ¶6, 599 P.2d 413, 414-15. Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTk3MQ==